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tax at the time of transfer since capital gains tax can be paid by the trustee
in the same manner that gift tax is paid in the net gift transaction.123 Indeed, the inequity arises when the burden of deferred taxation falls on the
donee who must pay tax on gain that he has not received. 124 Additionally,
reliance on Crane will undoubtedly result in more consistent and predictable
results than the application of the less comprehensive concepts. Tax consequences will be determined by objective criteria such as the amount of
encumbering indebtedness and the grantor's adjusted basis rather than the
subjective questions of fact regarding the intent of the parties or the technical
questions of local law regarding the formalities of legal liability.
In light of the foregoing, it seems the Tax Court's decision in Hirst is
the result of misplaced reliance on Turner. For the same reasons, the only
appropriate action for the Fourth Circuit would be to reverse the decision
on appeal. Assuming Johnson is ultimately followed, the applicability of
the part-sale, part-gift concept under Crane should be firmly established in
the field of encumbered gifts and net gifts.
CONCLUSION

In practice, the part-sale concept will be a two-edge sword. The Commissioner will be able to effectively tax the transfer in trust of highly encumbered low basis property such as real estate tax shelters. Assuming
Hirst is reversed, the net gift of highly appreciated property will be of
diminished value to the taxpayer. However, the partial sale concept will
provide significant advantages to the taxpayer. The characterization of a
transfer as a partial sale establishes a safe harbor from the subsequent
attribution of ordinary income under section 677. Without the allocation
of basis, the part-sale approach allows a full tax free return of capital. Thus,
the net gift will still be superior to the partial liquidation of assets that
would inevitably entail an allocation of basis. Furthermore, in the vast
majority of normal transfers in trust, taxpayers will be able to accurately
predict the correct tax consequences and plan accordingly. It is the consistency
of Crane that will ultimately benefit both parties by resolving the needless
uncertainty surrounding gifts of encumbered property.
JOSEPH BAIRD LEFTER

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE LAND USE PLANNING
CONTEXT: PRESERVING THE BARRIER OF PRESUMPTIVE
VALIDITY
Rapid growth and shifts in population have created complex problems
for local government in providing services, ensuring efficient and equitable
use of land, and keeping pace with the demands of ever-present change.
Particularly troublesome are attempts to halt the flight from the inner city
123.
124.

495 F.2d at 1084, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,821.
See Berl. supra note 66, at 1043-44.
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that causes an erosion of the tax base and that contributes to the financial
difficulties of major cities. To overcome these problems, local governments
must judiciously apply every available means of regulation. Under such
trying circumstances, it is likely that local government may incorporate methods
that arguably infringe on the rights of individuals. Property rights and freedom
of speech are basic interests that have been closely guarded in our society.
When the zoning process comes into conflict with a person's constitutional
rights, the judiciary must weigh the state's interests in regulation against the
rights of the individual.
Zoning is a formidable power - one to which courts historically have
extended considerable deference.1 The presumptive validity accorded zoning
legislation has consistently prevailed over challenges based on property
rights. But what results when the zoning power infringes on the most fundamental freedom - free expression? The impact of free speech on land use
planning touches urban planners and city officials as well as those who seek
to preserve the special place that the first amendment has among the protected
freedoms. This note examines the potential impact of free speech in the
land use planning context with special emphasis on the implications of a
2
judicial preference of one interest over the other.
FiRST AMENDmENT

First amendment freedoms historically have received special protection
from the courts.3 This revered position is based on the assumption that
freedom of expression is essential to a democratic society.4 Given this value,
the judiciary is charged with defining the limits of free speech and reconciling
this interest with other societal needs.5 The task is complex and difficult;6
therefore, it is not surprising that courts, judges, and writers have differed
1. The power to zone is a shorthand expression for an authority vested in local government under the police power to determine land use policies.
2. Zoning and the first amendment have each been favorite and frequent subjects for
writers, judges, and scholars. For that reason, this note will narrowly address the issues
concerning the rather unique interaction between these two preferred interests.
3. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-72 (1964); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Justification for such deference has
been articulated by some of the most eminent judges and writers in legal history. See, e.g.,
United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-27 (1937) (Cardozo, J.); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.

357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J.); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
(Learned Hand, J.); T.I. EMERSON, THE SysTEm OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
4. Professor Emerson emphasizes the essentiality of free expression as (1) a means
for assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) a process for advancing knowledge, (3) a means
for providing participation in decision making by all members of society, and (4) a method
of achieving a more adaptable and stable community by balancing stability and change.
T.I. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 6-7. But he doubts that the validity of his premises could
ever be proved. Id. at 7.
5. T.I. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 9. See text accompanying notes 135-136 infra.
6. Professor Emerson warns that first amendment policy issues are highly sophisticated.
Short-term advantage must often be sacrif!ed for long-range goals, and this process
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as to the appropriate judicial stance on first amendment issues. 7 Courts
have generally applied a balancing approach when free speech has infringed
on other interests,3 but the weight to be accorded competing factors is far
from clear despite the volume of litigation and commentary in this area.
Perhaps, the articulation of a general legal doctrine pertaining to free speech
is impossible because of the enormous complexity of the competing values
and the fluidity of the roles of the institutions that maintain those values.9
This complexity surrounding free expression has spawned a lack of uniformity of analysis, which, in turn, has caused unpredictability when the
courts have weighed free speech concerns with governmental regulatory functions that restrict expression in order to promote the public good. The first
amendment is not absolute,' 0 and the judiciary has given free speech varying
degrees of deference depending on the context and facts of each case.'
operates in an emotion-charged atmosphere "subject to powerful conflicting forces of
self-interest." Only narrow exceptions to the preferred status of free speech should be
applied, or the exceptions "are likely to swallow up the principle." Often limitations
cut "far more widely and deeply than is necessary," and the apparatus of government tends
to operate with "excessive zeal," which may "exert a repressive influence on freedom of
expression." T.I. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 10-11.
7. Compare cases and materials cited in note 3 supra dealing with the preferred position
of freedom of speech with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
8. A common thread among first amendment cases has been the ongoing debate as to
whether free speech is absolute. Can a balancing approach be utilized in order that competing
interests may be recognized and considered? Proponents of the absolute approach include
Justices Black and Douglas; balancing has been promoted primarily by Justices Harlan,
Frankfurter, and Powell. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961);
Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv.
549 (1962); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case oJ
Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. Rs:v. 1001 (1972). The justices and commentators who assert
the absolute nature of first amendment protection for speech would extend absolute protection only for pure speech except when such speech takes the form of libel, obscenity, or
fighting words. See, e.g., 366 U.S. at 66 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). Pure speech is expression not "tainted by conduct" or
"speech plus." See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609-10 (1969) (Black J., dissenting);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (constitutional protection
is not extended to speech that accompanies conduct in violation of a valid statute). Virtually
all involvement of freedom of expression in the zoning context will consist of speech plus,
e.g., sale of adult literature, adult theaters, and sign control. Thus, the argument for
absolute protection of expression is prima facie not applicable in the zoning context. In
fact, it is probable that the approaches of the debaters of absolutes versus balancing are
not as disparate as the frequency of their encounters would have us believe. See, e.g., Kalven.
Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428 (1967).
9. See generally T.I. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 4-9. The problem has been complicated
because courts have camouflaged policy by using sweeping generalizations and terminology.
See text accompanying notes 191-193 infra.
10. See note 8 supra; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meicklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
11. The courts' response when free speech has conflicted with another right can be
illustrated by the following examples: (1) The contempt power. See Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375 (1962). But cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (state interest in regulating
the conduct of elections); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding the ban on
picketing a courthouse). See T.). EMERSON, supra note 3, at 451-59. (2) State protection of
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Furthermore, first amendment cases are not "fungible," and courts have been
12
criticized for using first amendment precedent out of context.
Despite the difficulty of the task, decisions must be rendered on justiciable
issues. Stare decisis requires analysis and application of relevant cases. 13 Thus,
the legal principles developed in a myriad of free speech contexts may be
applicable when the first amendment confronts zoning legislation. Two free
speech concepts that merit discussion because of their applicability to land
use planning 4 are the impact of a combined first amendment and equal
protection claim and the doctrine of least restrictive alternative.

FirstAmendment and Equal Protection
Traditionally, the equal protection clause provided minimal protection
from unreasonable discrimination as a result of state action,' 5 but more
recently courts have embraced a more interventionist two-tiered approach in
the academic environment. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See
T.I. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 607-10; Van Alystyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student
Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1968); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus,
22 VAND. L. RPv. 1027 (1969). (3) State control of the prison environment. See Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). (4) The state's interest in the control of the conduct
of attorneys. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See also United Transp. Union v.
State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Symposium, Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 279 (1965). (5) State regulation of labor picketing. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284
(1957). See also Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); T.I. EMERSON,
supra note 3, at 439-44; Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! Amidst Confusion,
A Consistent Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137 (1956).
12. See note 11 supra. In a concurring opinion in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972),
justice Rehnquist, noting that "[p]rior cases dealing with First Amendment rights are not
fungible goods," criticized the application to the academic environment of first amendment
cases involving the imposition of criminal sanctions or prior restraint imposed by the
injunctive process of a court. Id. at 203. Justice Powell's majority opinion in Healy has been
criticized as confusing and contradictory because of its indiscriminate citing of first amendment cases from other contexts and reliance on the special needs of the campus in only
one portion of the opinion. Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court:
The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972). One reason that first amendment
cases are not fungible is the fact that free expression claims cut across the whole range
of regulation in our society. In varying contexts free speech is supported by different
policies and should be balanced with the pertinent policies in mind.
13. In this manner, courts buttress the system of free expression and keep it in
"successful equilibrium." T.I. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 12, 11-14 (role of law and legal
institutions), 14-20 (formulation of legal principles). However, the issues may be just as
obscure after analysis of the relevant case law. An example is Justice Black's plurality
opinion in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), in which he commented on
the confusion present in the past holdings in the area of investigation prior to admission
to the bar. Justice Black concluded that the best way to resolve the issue was to refer
to the "45 words that make up the First Amendment." 401 U.S. at 4.
14. Both of these concepts have received the attention of the courts in a case that
involved free speech and zoning. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct.

2440 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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dealing with equal protection issues. 16 The first tier is characterized by the
traditional deferential approach, applying a mere rationality standard of
review.17 The second tier of analysis applies strict scrutiny to both the ends
and the means of legislative action when either a suspect classification or
an impact on fundamental rights is present.18 Fundamental rights are those
that are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."19 When
expressive conduct is involved, the stricter standard of review is appropriate.20
In Cox v. Louisiana,'2 the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana statute
prohibiting obstruction of public streets and passageways except by a bona
fide labor organization conducting legal activities such as picketing. 2 2 Justice
Black's concurring opinion attacked the Louisiana statute on equal protection
grounds23 but emphasized that the defendant was not entitled to the same
16. See Gunther, Forward: In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
17. The rational basis or the minimal scrutiny test is roughly analogous to the old
equal protection standard that focused on the means used by the legislature and required
merely that the classification in the regulation reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.
See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). This approach was
used for review of economic and social legislation during the Warren Court era, but expanding utilization of strict scrutiny caused minimal scrutiny to mean "virtually none in
fact." The Burger Court, however, has departed from the traditional connotations of the
rational basis test and with increasing frequency has sustained equal protection claims on
mere rationality grounds. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Gunther, supra note 16, at 19-20; Tussman & ten Broeck, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
18. See Gunther, supra note 16, at 9-10; Kurland, Equal in Origin and Equal in Title
to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143 (1964).
It is unclear as to whether the two categories giving rise to strict scrutiny are independent or
interrelated. See Gunther, supra note 16, at 9 n.36, in which Professor Gunther speculates
that the two might be "related gradients," "intersecting variables," or "intertwined helices."
In any event, the Warren Court expanded strict scrutiny intervention by extending suspect
categories and broadening the characterization of fundamental rights. See McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (characterizing wealth and race as
suspect classifications); Gunther, supra note 16, at 8-10; Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v.
Mulkey: Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Or. REV. 39.
19. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Some rights
that have been found to be fundamental include: privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
20. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972). The combined application of equal
protection and free speech originally occurred in the context of access to public areas for
the purpose of assembly or speech. In Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953), the
Court held that refusing to allow Jehovah's Witnesses to conduct religious services in a
park, although others were granted permission, violated the first amendment. Cox v.
Louisiana reiterated the doctrine laid down in Fowler. See text accompanying notes 21-24
infra; T.I. EMERSON, supra note 3,at 303-07 (1970).
21. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
22. Appellant Cox led a civil rights demonstration opposite the courthouse in Baton
Rouge to protest segregation and the prior arrest of certain students. The protestors drew
a crowd but did not obstruct the street. A sheriff present on the scene attempted to break
up the demonstration, and eventually a measure of force was used to subdue the demonstrators. 379 U.S. at 546-47.
23. "Louisiana is attempting to pick and chooce among the views it is willing to
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protection afforded those who communicate ideas by pure speech.24 While
picketing was a mode of expression subject to broad state regulation, the
statute in Cox was constitutionally defective on first amendment and equal
2
protection grounds. 5
Justice Black's equal protection analysis in Cox was accepted by the
majority in Police Department v. Mosley, 26 in which the Court was again
27
faced with a mixture of first amendment and equal protection issues.

Chicago had an ordinance under which peaceful
dispute with a school was permitted near the
peaceful picketing was prohibited.-a Respondent
department from enforcing the statute so that

picketing regarding a labor
school, although all other
sought to enjoin the police
he might peacefully picket

a segregated school in protest of that status. Writing for the Court, 29 Justice

Marshall identified the key problem of the Chicago ordinance as the distinction between labor and nonlabor picketing, stating that: "First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."30 Justice Marshall noted
that the ordinance went beyond time, place, and manner restrictions and
described impermissible picketing in terms of subject matter. "The regulation 'thus slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstances into a
concern about content.' This is never permitted."31
have discussed on its streets. It is thus trying to prescribe by law what matters of public
interest people whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This
seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. And to deny this appellant and his group the use of the streets
because of their views against racial discrimination, while allowing other groups to use
the streets to voice opinions on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 379
U.S. at 581. Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
24. Justice Black cited Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
25. The Court also invalidated the statute on the grounds that it placed too broad
a discretionary power in officials of the state with regard to allowing parades or meetings.
379 U.S. at 574. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
Cr. REv. 1, 29-30; Van Alystyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations,111 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 337-39 (1963).
26. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
27. "The equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with First Amendment interests." Id. at 95.
28. Id.
29. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in the result, and Chief Justice Burger
wrote a concurring opinion.
30. 408 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added). The quoted statement seems to be stronger than
the statements in any of the cases cited in support of the assertion. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1962); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949);
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
31. 408 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added) (quoting Kalven, supra note 25, at 29). Again, the
Court either was overstating the existing law or was breaking ground with such
absolute statements. The Court recognized the state's substantial interest in preventing
disruption of educational activities, cf. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), but held that the manner in which the ordinance advanced the objective was not
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The majority opinion in Mosley drew criticism from Chief Justice Burger
in his concurring opinion. Joining in the result, Chief Justice Burger withheld
his support of certain assertions regarding the first amendment. He felt
2
that, read out of context, some of the language could be misleading and
"the right to express
indicated that the first amendment does not guarantee
' 33
"
censorship.
government
from
free
thought
any
The Mosley opinion stands as an example of the intersection of first
amendment and equal protection guarantees and the level of scrutiny and
deference afforded the first amendment when it is balanced with the police
power. Application of the Mosley rationale to the zoning context raises some
interesting issues. 34 The power to zone and the police power to regulate
picketing emerge from the same source of authority. 35 Mosley thus represents
a significant limitation on the police power that seemingly can be applied
to invalidate a zoning ordinance that discriminates as to content of expression. 31
FirstAmendment and Alternatives Analysis
Another significant concept applicable to first amendment analysis is that
of least restrictive alternative. Courts are occasionally confronted with issues
requiring analysis of legislative decisions regarding the choice of alternatives
for regulation. 37 To what extent can the courts choose the best alternative or
restrict the legislature to the narrowest available alternative? In Schneider
v. State,38 the Supreme Court held that the state could not prohibit the
distribution of leaflets on city streets as a means of preventing littering when
there were other ways to accomplish such legitimate ends without abridging

consistent with the equal protection clause. 408 U.S. at 99. The Court quoted Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), in framing the equal protection issue: "The crucial question
is whether [Chicago's ordinancel advances that objective in a manner consistent with the
command of the Equal Protection Clause." 408 U.S. at 99.
Justice Marshall stressed that statutes affecting first amendment interests must be
narrowly drawn, and that "[f]reedom of expression, and its intersection with the guarantee
of equal protection, would rest on a soft foundation indeed, if government could distinguish
among picketers on such a wholesale and categorical basis." Id. at 101.
32. Id. at 102-03 (concurring opinion). See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96
S. Ct. 2440 (1976); see text accompanying note 141 infra.
33. Id. at 103 (quoting the majority opinion at 96).
34. Cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 201-03 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist found difficulty in the application of first amendment cases dealing with
criminal sanctions, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), or prior restraint, Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). to a case dealing with the government as an educational
administrator. See note 12 supra.
35. See note 97 infra.
36. But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976). See text
accompanying notes 125-128, 140-142 infra. Under the American Mini Theatres approach, the
application of Mosley in the zoning context is in serious doubt.
37. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939). Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).

38. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 4
LAND USE PLANNING

freedom of speech and the press.3 9 Arguably in Schneider the Court refrained
from selecting its own alternative over that of the legislature. Instead, the
Court determined the reasonableness of the ordinance in light of the end
sought, the effect of the regulation on free speech, and the availability of
less restrictive alternatives.40
Examination for less restrictive alternatives is compatible with first amendment strict scrutiny and the overbreadth technique of invalidating legislation
that unduly infringes on first amendment rights. 41 But forays into these
matters may be subject to the criticism that the courts are encroaching on
the province of the legislature. 42 The criticism gains added weight when the
issues are complex and the legislative decisions are based on analysis of
many competing factors and a vast amount of data. Perhaps the best role
for the judiciary is that envisioned by Justice Frankfurter, by which the
court examines the alternative selected by the legislature for reasonableness
utilizing the appropriate standard of scrutiny. 43 Clearly, alternatives analysis
is a factor to be considered when balancing competing claims in the zoning
context.
ZONING

Zoning is a function of the police power through which "the government
regulates the conduct of its citizens . . . and the manner in which each
shall use his own property."- Historically, when private property became
"clothed with a public interest," the owner could be required to submit to
public control for the common good. 45 The role of the courts in the evolution
39. Id. at 165. The Court noted that the same end might be accomplished by applying
penal law sanctions not to the pamphleteer but to the recipient who actually does the
littering.
40. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 492-94 (1960) (dissenting opinion). In his dissent,
Justice Frankfurter noted: "Whenever the reasonableness and fairness of a measure are at
issue .. .the availability or unavailability of alternative methods of proceeding is germane,"
but the consideration of alternatives does not alter or displace the Court's role of applying
a standard of reasonableness to the legislative action. Id. at 493. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). In Shelton the majority restricted the legislature to
narrower means of accomplishing the objective of examining public school teachers, an
approach that drew the criticism of Justice Frankfurter. 364 U.S. at 492-94.
41. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), in which the Court found the
Arizona Act requiring a loyalty oath from state employees unconstitutionally overbroad. The
Court found that the Act threatened first amendment freedom of association. A statute
affecting those rights must be "narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as
constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State." Id. at 18
(quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)). Laws that apply to membership
in an organization without the specific intent to further its illegal goals violate protected
freedoms. The Arizona Act did not make this necessary distinction and was thus overbroad
and unconstitutional.
42. Added to this would be the criticism that the courts are acting in areas in which
they do not have adequate knowledge or expertise. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 357 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
43. See text accompanying notes 198-202 infra.
44. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877).
45. Id. at 126.
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of the power of the state over land has been characterized by a changing
judicial philosophy. " 6 Traditional concepts of property governed the courts'
attitude toward power over land, and throughout American history courts
have tended to protect the relationship between people and the land.4
Although the common law seldom permitted interference with the private
use of land, 48 the concept of unrestricted rights in real property conflicts
with the needs of society as a whole. As the population has grown, the
government has assumed a more active role in land use regulation.49
The principal mode of land use regulation that developed to promote the
public interest was the police power. 50 The flexibility of the police power
as compared to nuisance remedies permitted the former to regulate wider
varieties of conduct, and early cases seemed to indicate that the police power
was a potential source of great legislative authority.51 The increased intervention of government into private affairs to safeguard individual rights
created a real and substantial threat of governmental interference with those
46. Ragsdale & Sher, The Court's Role in the Evolution of Power Over Land, 7 URBAN
LAW. 60, 95 (1975) (presenting an excellent historical overview of power over land). See
also Large, This Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L.
REV. 1039 (1973); Schnidman, The Courts Enter the Zoning Caine: Will Local Government
Win or Lose?, 43 CEO. 'WASH. L. REv. 590 (1975).
47. Ragsdale & Sher, supra note 46, at 95.
48. However, nuisance theory provided a remedy when one person's use of his land
unreasonably interfered with another's enjoyment of his own property. W. PROSSER, TORTS
572 (4th ed. 1971). See Large, supra note 46, at 1046-47.
49. Ragsdale & Sher, supra note 46, at 95. Professor Donald Large effectively articulated
the dilemma as follows: "We live on what has been described as a spaceship containing a
finite quantity of resources, especially land. We now realize that whatever the state of
its title, one parcel of land is inextricably intertwined with other parcels, and that causes
and effects flow across artificially imposed divisions in the land without regard for legal
boundaries. The land simply cannot be neatly divided into mine and yours." Large, supra
note 46, at 1045 (citing Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in THE
HANDBOOK 97 (G. DeBell ed. 1970) and Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 36-37 (G. DeBell ed. 1970)).
ENVIRONMENTAL

50. While the police power and public nuisance have a common authority base, there
are some important distinctions in application. First, public nuisance is not a power but a
legal conclusion with regard to the status of an activity that harms or may harm the
public good, although power may be employed to control nuisance activity. Second, the
police power is not limited to common law nuisance designations; the legislature can
extend the reach of the police power within constitutional limits. Third, the police power
can be exercised against a given activity sooner, that is, before actual nuisance conditions
have developed. Ragsdale & Sher, supra note 46, at 70. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
51. Ragsdale & Sher, suprra note 46, at 70-71. See, e.g., The Railroad Comm'n Cases.
116 U.S. 307 (1886); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (emphasizing that the police power
included regulation of individual use of property when such regulation becomes necessary for
the public good).
However, the Court seemed to be cultivating the means to establish limits to the police
power. While sustaining state regulation of railroad rates, Chief Justice Waite warned: "[I]t
is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit.
This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of
confiscation." The Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886). See Slaughter-House
Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
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rights. 52 The United States Supreme Court responded to check the trend at
the start of the twentieth century, 53 and stricter review of legislative activity
54
thrust the Court into the role of balancing individual and collective interests.
The legislature could exercise control over the property or economic activities
of an individual person subject to the limitations of due process. Under this
approach, a valid law might become invalid as applied to an individual
through unjust taking.55 Historically, the courts were permissive with regard
56
to governmental land use regulation, but the constitutionally protected

52. Ragsdale & Sher, supra note 46, at 76. "The line between regulation to safeguard
individual rights and governmental interference with those rights is impossible to draw
and easily crossed." Id.
53. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). The power of a municipality to regulate the use of land, no matter how desirable the
goal, cannot be achieved by laws that deprive individuals of their constitutional rights.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
54. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). But cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954), in which a comprehensive land use plan for the District of Columbia was upheld.
The Berman Court indicated that, while these matters are within the legitimate police power
of the government, the broad authority given the legislature in determining a plan is
subject to "specified Constitutional limitations."
The Court's ill-fated stance on substantive 'due process in the economic field was
pitted directly against the need for flexibility and utility inherent in legislative controls.
See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934). Fortunately, a middle ground existed through judicial balancing.
55. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). See Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The government may take property for a public purpose under
the power of eminent domain. When it merely regulates property use for the public good,
it does so under the police power. The property owner must be compensated under the
former but not always in the latter circumstances. See Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable
Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. Rv.
1, 2 (1972). The distinction between these concepts is rather complex, and the courts must
delineate the constitutionality of such government regulation. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 598 (1962) (regulation that "completely prohibits a beneficial
use to which the property has previously been devoted" held nevertheless to be justified as
a reasonable exercise of the police power); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922).
56. The landmark case illustrating judicial validation of the zoning power is Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Hadacheck had built a brickyard at substantial cost outside the city limits of Los Angeles. Because of clay deposits on the land, the property was
worth $800,000 for use in the manufacture of brick but only $60,000 otherwise. Los Angeles
annexed the land on which the brickyard was located and passed an ordinance banning the
manufacture of bricks in the area that included Hadacheck's property. Since it would have
cost Hadacheck more than the market value of the land to fill the excavation, he continued to
operate his business and was prosecuted and convicted under the ordinance. The Court
affirmed Hadacheck's conviction on the basis of its valid health purpose and the ability of
the city to limit activities in designated sections of the city. See Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of
Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915). Contra,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Hadacheck has unquestionably
survived with regard to cases involving open pits in populated areas. See, e.g., Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638,
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 9 N.Y.2d 101, 172
N.E.2d 562, 211 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1961), afl'd, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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rights of property owners constantly loomed as a counterforce to the police
57
power to zone.
During the peak of economic due process, a divided Court upheld a
general zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 58 Since Euclid, challenges to zoning laws by
property owners have largely been limited to the state and lower federal
courts. 59 The traditional notions of private property have been omnipresent
in the courts' analyses and balancing of interests,60 but societal needs have
created pressures to limit private property rights of the individual.6
Zoning and the Courts
In the first zoning case decided by the Supreme Court, Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,6 2 an ordinance classifying land use was challenged by a
landowner who alleged that the restricted-use ordinance operated to reduce
the value of his land, which deprived him of property without due process. 63
The Court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of police power
because the validity of the classification involved was "fairly debatable" and
57. The urgency of the governmental purpose is weighed against the diminution in
market value of the land affected. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413(1922).
There are, of course, other constitutional limitations to governmental land regulation such
as changing a pre-existing status, planning ahead for unreasonable lengths of time and
limiting an area to the status quo. See Large, supra note 46, at 1053-57. See, e.g., 260 U.S.
at 413-14; Vernon Park Realty Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517
(1954) (severe limiting of value of plaintiff's property by restricting it to present use not
reasonable on the facts); Averne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587
(1938) (hardship resulting from land use limitations cannot extend for unreasonable periods
of time).
58. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Euclid Court held that legislative judgment must control
in classifying and defining zones in furtherance of the general welfare. While Euclid upheld
the concept of zoning as constitutional, the Court indicated that it was not passing on
specific applications of zoning: ordinances. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), illustrated the fact that that an otherwise valid zoning ordinance might be
unconstitutional as applied in a particular fact situation. See text accompanying notes 62-65
infra.
59. After Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), further developments in the
principles of zoning were left to state and lower federal courts until Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), Since Goldblatt, the Supreme Court has heard the Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S.
Ct. 2440 (1976). The implications of delegating virtually all zoning cases to lower courts is
explored elsewhere in this note. See text accompanying notes 77-86 infra. For a description
of zoning cases in the lower courts, see generally Symposium, Land Planning in a Democracy,
20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1955).
60. See Large, supra note 46, at 1076, 1082-83; Binder, supra note 55, at 1-18. The
"taking versus regulating" analysis has survived. See text accompanying notes 70-86 infra.
61. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (demonstrating the power permitted for
environmental protection); Large, supra note 46, at 1063-83. Cf. Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance that limited a residential area
to single family dwellings).
62. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
63. Id. at 367.
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therefore it could not be said to be wholly arbitrary.64 Characterizing zoning
laws as legislative in nature, the Court presumed these enactments to be
constitutional. 06
Twenty-eight years later, in Berman v. Parker,66 the Supreme Court
sustained a District of Columbia land use project against a claim by landowner that the project constituted a taking of his property without due
process under the fifth amendment. 67 The argument against the ordinance
was that the legislative purpose of the act, development of a balanced, more
attractive community, was not sufficient to justify the application of the police
power.68 The Court refused to limit the public interest objectives that the
legislature may appropriately consider when establishing such regulations. 69
Thus, Berman furthered the Euclid characterization with regard to the legislative nature of land use control and emphasized the freedom with which
legislatures could promulgate land use regulation. According to Berman, once
the public purpose for the project has been established, the means of
executing the project are to be determined solely by the legislature.7° Sanctioning a withdrawal of judicial review from urban renewal activity, the Berman
decision created a presumptive validity for land use regulation based on
the "almost-infinite trust in the beneficence of governmental operations. ' ' 71
demise of effective judicial supervision of
Such a mandate resulted in the
72
urban renewal in this country.
64. Id. at 588.
65. ld. at 367. But see note 191 infra. See Schnidman, supra note 46, at 591. The validity
of the ordinance "varies with circumstances and conditions." 272 U.S. at 387. Two years
later in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), a zoning ordinance was held
unconstitutional as applied. See note 58 supra. In another case, a provision of a Seattle
zoning ordinance that permitted a "philanthropic home for . . . old people" in a classified
district, which required the permission of two-thirds of the property owners within 400
feet of the proposed site of the building, was held unconstitutional. Seattle Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). But see Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917)
(billboard case reaching opposite result from Roberge. Roberge is distinguishable because
the home for the aged was not shown to be an inconvenience or annoyance to the
community). Prior to Euclid, the Court had invalidated a zoning ordinance by which an individual was barred from acquiring real property in a residential area due to race. Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
66. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The Berman case involved urban renewal and was not a zoning
case per se. The impact on zoning is readily apparent. See note 72 infra.
67. Id. at 28.
68. Id. at 31.
69. The Court stated: "We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project
is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive ....
The values it represents are spiritual as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Id. at 33.
70. Id.
71. Williams & Doughty, Studies in Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre,
and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 73, 86-87 (1975). As a result of the decision, judicial review
has been minimal among state and federal courts. Professor Williams asserted that local
authorities can and have run "roughshod" over the rights of small property owners affected
by urban renewal. Id. at 84, 85-89.
72. Id. at 89. In his article Professor Williams noted that Belle Terre and Berman
are strikingly consistent with each other. He contrasted, however, Southern Burlington
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Zoning, Urban Planning,and the Presumption
There are some important legal distinctions between a land use plan and
the local zoning regulation that implements the plan.73 While a land use
plan enunciates the development policies of a governmental unit, the legal
effectiveness of the plan reposes in zoning regulations. 7 4 But the plan
"provides a control over the zoning process," and some statutes provide
that zoning must be "in accord" with the comprehensive plan.75 Generally,
the plan and zoning policy are initiated at the local level, and the functions
of sanctioning, developing, and implementing the plan are basically legislative.7

The mere existence of a planning/zoning dichotomy suggests complicated
relationships between these two functions 77 that undoubtedly add to the
difficulty involved with judicial review of zoning and land use planning.
The varied policies and structure of the local planning function impacts on
the ability of the courts to scrutinize effectively land use plans and zoning
ordinances.7 8 It is reasonable to assume that the complexity of land use
planning was a significant factor in placing the authority to zone at the
local level. 79 Policy development has been controlled by the legislative arm
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), which
presented a more "realistic" approach to zoning issues. Id. at 93. For an analysis of
Belle Terre, see text accompanying notes 87-96 infra.
73. The initial zoning enabling act stipulated that the zoning power must be
exercised "in accordance with a comprehensive plan," but there has been a great deal of
confusion and variation in application of this phrase. In the extreme case, the zoning
ordinance has been the source of land-use planning. D.R. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA

57-58 (1971) (quoting Black, The Comprehensive Plan in WI. GOODMAN & E.C.
PRINCIPLES

AND

PRACTICE OF

FRUEND,

URBAN PLANNING 349 (1968)). The distinctions among terms

used in land use planning, urban planning, and zoning are set out effectively in F. CH-APIN,
URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 355-59 (2d ed. 1972).

74. D.R. MANDELKER, supra note 73, at 2. Professor Mandelker's book explores the relationships between planning and zoning and their impact on private ownership. Further,
the work surveys the role of law and policy in land use control. Id. at 1-20. For two
general sources on zoning and urban planning, see SI. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969);
Symposium, The Urbanization Game, 36 AM. INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS (1970).
75. D.R. MANDELKER, supra note 73, at 3. It follows that no single zoning ordinance
is likely to be "comprehensive in scope and sound in content unless based on a previously
prepared land use plan." F. CHAPIN, supra note 73, at 356. In keeping with the trend
among states of mandating comprehensive land use plans, Florida recently passed the
Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 that requires every local government
in the state to prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan by July 1979. FLA. STAT. §163.3161
(1975). See generally Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 1154
(1955).
76. D.R. MANDELKER, supra note 73, at 3. See note 59 supra. But see note 182 infra.
77. The results of Professor Mandelker's study uncovered a complexity in the relationships far beyond what he had imagined. D.R. MANDELKER, supra note 73, at xiii.
78. If a court elects to engage in scrutiny of the means to include alternatives analysis,
the morass of land use planning and zoning presents a formidable barrier. The court
would undoubtedly be subject to criticism for encroaching on the province of the legislature.
See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
79. Not only is the authority placed at the local (municipal) level, but there are
strikingly few checks on the local zoning power, and such regulation "goes unchallenged
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of local government,80 and the courts have chosen to limit interference with
local zoning policy. 8 ' Hence, the culmination of the local nature of the policies
involved, the refusal of the courts to police those policies, and the judiciary's
lack of experience and resources for dealing with such matters has created a
formidable barrier to judicial action in zoning and local planning.
The Supreme Court's initial pronouncement that zoning laws were to be
presumed constitutional8 2 presented lower courts with an opportunity to clothe
their decisions with generalities and to avoid complex policy issues.83 Furthermore, the Supreme Court chose to remove itself almost completely from the
resolution of land use regulation cases.s 4 Eventually the presumptive validity
of zoning ordinances overcame even the constitutional argument of taking
without due process of law, and it was accepted that the normal effect of
land use regulation would be to reduce the value of property.8 5 Thus, courts

unless judicial review is brought to bear." D.R. MANDELKER, supra note 73, at 4.
80. The failure of local governments to articulate policies and the variety of needs
encountered in different communities present further problems for the courts. Id. at 8.
81. The courts "for the most part have refused to inquire either into the basis of
policy or its fairness in application, at the same time leaving the door open for judicial
intervention when they think it necessary." Id. at 8. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 929 (2d Cir.
1968) (court recognized that urban renewal presents "political" questions appropriate for
the legislative and executive branches of government). But see Ranjel v. City of Lansing,
293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1059
(1970) (court considered policy basis of proposed referendum on ordinance of city council
that amended a zoning ordinance); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 18 (1975) (when zoning is on a
municipal basis rather than regionally and there is no binding agreement among municipalities, the court concluded that each municipality must bear its fair share of the regional
burden).
82. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367 (1926). See note 65 supra.
The power to zone is not, of course, the only governmental authority backed by a presumptive
validity. Among others, the taxing power and eminent domain stands out as examples of
powers with a presumption of validity on their behalf. An example of the court's deference
to legislative authority is found in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (Court refused to
sit as a "super legislature" in a case challenging the authority of Kansas to prohibit anyone
from engaging in the business of debt adjusting).
83. See text accompanying notes 191-193 infra.
84. See note 59 supra. The inexperience of the Supreme Court in dealing with zoning
matters is strikingly illustrated by the Belle Terre opinion in which only four cases
dealing with land use controls were cited: Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Washington
cx rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917) (regulation of billboards). Berman and Cusack received little emphasis, and the most recent of the
other cases cited was forty-six years old! It is questionable whether examination of these
opinions would provide adequate guidance for the court in view of the massive changes
that have occurred in zoning law. Williams & Doughty, supra note 71, at 77-78. See Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976) (no zoning cases cited in the plurality
opinion).
85. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974). Cf. Berman v.
Parker, 348 US. 26 (1948).
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may be reluctant to cast aside presumptive validity to apply the close scrutiny
6
required when a fundamental right is at issues
Zoning Meets a FirstAmendment Challenge
In 1974 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas87 brought new challenges to the
state's broad authority to regulate the use of land."" In Belle Terre the owners
and lessees of a house in the village sought to enjoin as unconstitutional a
Belle Terre ordinance that restricted land use to single family dwellings
except for lodging, boarding, fraternity, or multiple-dwelling houses.8 9 The
Court treated the challenge as one involving economic and social legislation
and applied a minimal scrutiny equal protection analysis.90 Taking a view
consistent with prior decisions in the land use regulation area, the Court
respected the legislature's discretion to choose among various social objectives.
Berman was cited in support of the legislative authority to establish legitimate
guidelines "addressed to family needs." 91 The Court found that the ordinance
involved no fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Since a
"family" may entertain whomever it likes, the ordinance did not offend the
92
first amendment right of association.
Justice Marshall's dissent questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance
on the basis of the fundamental rights of privacy and association." According
to Justice Marshall, deference should be given the state's judgments regarding
land use planning, and the Court should not normally "sit as a zoning board
of appeals .... But deference does not mean abdication."94 Justice Marshall
86. But see, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 174-75, 336 A.2d 713, 735 (1975).
87. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
88. The challenges included, inter alia, the right to travel and privacy. Id. at 7.
89. Belle Terre is a village that covers less than one square mile of land area and has
about 220 homes and 700 people. Id. at 2. The word "family" in the ordinance means: "One
or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living or cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons not exceeding
two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by
blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family." Id.
90. The law would be validated if it was "reasonable not arbitrary." Id. at 8 (quoting
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). It must also "bear 'a rational
relationship to a [permissible] state objective.'" 416 U.S. at 8 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971)).
91. 416 U.S. at 8-9. See note 72 supra.
92. Id. at 7, 9. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with this finding.
See text accompanying notes 93-96 infra.
93. Id. at 12-13 (dissenting opinion). In a separate dissent, Justice Brennan asserted
that the case should have been dismissed as moot.
94. Id. at 13, 14. Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that the ordinance was in
furtherance of legitimate objectives of "restricting uncontrolled growth, solving traffic
problems, keeping rental costs at a reasonable level, and making the community attrictive
to families." Id. Citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), and Citizens Ass'n v.
Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Justice Marshall asserted: "I think it
clear that the First Amendment provides some limitation on zoning laws. It is inconceivable
to me that we would allow the exercise of the zoning power to burden First Amendment
freedoms, as by ordinances that restrict occupancy to individuals adhering to particular
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would have applied a strict standard of scrutiny 5 to find the ordinance
constitutionally defective as both overinclusive and underinclusive. 6
The Belle Terre case indicates that the deference afforded zoning has not
diminished. The summary dismissal of the constitutional challenges to the
ordinance left the zoning function intact, although a direct confrontation
with a fundamental right did not take place. The Court did not have to
choose an approach by which zoning and the first amendment freedoms
should be compared. However, Justice Marshall's well-reasoned dissent warned
that a different result might be reached if a majority of the Court recognizes
that a fundamental right has been violated by a zoning ordinance.
Free Speech and Zoning Regulation in the Courts
Free speech considerations have not materially affected the states' zoning
power.0 7 In People v. Stover,95 defendants, alleging a violation of first amendment and due process rights, challenged a city ordinance that prohibited the
maintenance of clotheslines in a front or side yard abutting a street. ° 9
As a protest against high taxes imposed by the city, 100 the defendants had
erected their clothesline in the front yard. The court sustained the ordinance
as a valid attempt to preserve the appearance and property values of the
city. The first amendment challenge did not trigger strict scrutiny by the

religious, political, or scientific beliefs." 416 U.S. at 14. Note that Justice Marshall was
not specifically referring to the first amendment freedom of expression, which was not
at issue in Belle Terre.

95. 416 U.S. at 18. Justice Marshall would require "a clear showing that the burden
imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest." Id.
96. 416 U.S. at 18. Justice Marshall would "not ask the village to abandon its goal of
providing quiet streets, little traffic, and a pleasant and reasonably priced environment in
which families might raise their children. Rather, [he] would commend the town to
continue to pursue those purposes but by means of more carefully drawn and even-handed
legislation." Id. at 20.
97. As indicated above, the zoning and land use planning processes are accomplished
through the authority of the police power. Courts and legal writers have referred to the
police power exercised in zoning cases as "zoning power." See, e.g., D.R. MANDELKER, supra
note 73, at 8.
98. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
99. 12 N.Y.2d at 465, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 736. The ordinance was
purportedly based on aesthetic considerations. See, e.g., Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic:
Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw & CONT MP. PRoB. 218 (1955); Comment, Planning and
Aesthetic Zoning- Getting More Out of What We've Got, 52

J.

URBAN L. 1033 (1975). The

regulation did provide for a permit to erect clotheslines if there was a difficulty or unnecessary
hardship involved. Defendant had applied for and was denied a permit. 12 N.Y.2d at
464-65, 191 N.E.2d ai 272-73, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 735-36. Cf. Missouri ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley,
458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (architectural control for aesthetic purposes).
100. 12 N.Y.2d at 464, 191 N.E.2d at 273, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 735. Defendants erected one
clothesline per year from 1956 until 1961 when the ordinance was enacted. There were six
lines in their front yard decorated with rags, scarecrows, and the like. Determining that
it was reasonable to assume that the ordinance was prompted by the defendants' conduct, the
court stressed that motivation was not to be examined "if the law would otherwise be held
constitutional." 12 N.Y.2d at 466, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
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court. 01' Instead, the court noted that the free speech rights were not absolute
or unlimited, "and they are subject to such reasonable regulation as is
02
provided by the ordinance before us."'
The ordinance and its prohibition bear 'no necessary relationship' to
the dissemination of ideas or opinion, and, accordingly, the defendants
were not privileged to violate it by choosing to express their views in
the altogether bizarre manner which they did. It is obvious that the
'
value of their protest lay not in its message but in its offensiveness." -,
The court was influenced by the "bizarre manner" in which the defendants
expressed their views, and the "offensiveness" of the protest weighed against
defendants when the court balanced their expression against the valid exercise
0
of the police power.' 4
The Stover case illustrates the difficulty of the courts' role in balancing
individual and collective interests. While the city made a reasonable effort
to proscribe conduct that was offensive to the public good, 105 the defendant
asserted claims that merited serious consideration and strict scrutiny by
the courts.0 6 The most troubling aspect of the case is the complete disregard
of the motive and effect of the ordinance as applied to this particular
0

defendant.1 7
101. The court found that the ordinance was not arbitrary or irrational and caused
no undue hardship to property owners. 12 N.Y.2d at 468, 191 N.E.2d at 275-76, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 739-40. In a dissenting opinion, Judge VanVoorhis emphasized the "right to be
different" and attacked the public basis of zoning for aesthetics or taste. 12 N.Y.2d at 47072, 191 N.E.2d at 277-78, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 740-42 (dissenting opinion).
102. 12 N.Y.2d at 469, 191 N.E.2d at 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 739. The court noted that the
fact that legislation directed toward a valid objective has an impact on speech or expression
does not necessarily invalidate the legislation. The city can exercise reasonable restrictions
as to time, place, and manner of expression. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554
(1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
103. 12 N.Y.2d at 470, 191 N.E.2d at 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 740. In view of the
motivation behind the legislation, the ordinance bore a more definite relationship to the
speech involved than the court was willing to admit. The actions of the city were tantamount to censorship. Should motive be examined when such obvious infringements on
expression occur? Clearly the courts have avoided examining legislative motive, and in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court held that the effect and not the purpose of
legislative action is to be considered in a constitutional challenge. Examining legislative motive
is, at best, difficult in most cases, and courts look to the legislative statement of purpose for
guidance. Yet, the Court has invalidated statutes that sought to regulate communication in
the governmental interest. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (concurring opinion). These cases arise,
however, in the context of potentially harmful speech.
104. It is doubtful that this reasoning has much merit today. Often an individual
must resort to imposing behavior to convey his message effectively. Cf. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (the state
may not shut off discourse without showing that "substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner").
105. Defendant Stover's activity was decidedly offensive and depressed property values.
106. Dr. Webster Stover, who was a former college president, went to jail rather
than pay the S100 fine resulting from the instant case. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1964, at 46,
col. 2.
107. See note 103 supra; text accompanying notes 183 & 184 infra.
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Zoning met another first amendment challenge in 106 Forsyth Corp. v.
Bishop,05 in which the plaintiff sought declaratory relief against a zoning
ordinance that prohibited the operation of an "Adult Movie House" within
200 yards of a church. 10 9 In upholding the restriction, the court asserted the
power and necessity for zoning laws and ordinances" ° and noted that "the
exercise of the police power in this regard must be upheld if any state of
facts either known or which could be assumed affords support for it.""'
Virtually ignoring the ordinance's distinction as to content of the subject
matter of the films,"

2

the court concluded that motion pictures should not

be afforded immunity from regulation when the "restraint upon such movies
23
is relatively minor and the public interest to be protected is substantial.""
The court attempted to bolster its decision by indicating that similar reasoning
has long been sufficient "to justify zoning with respect to alcoholic
beverages,""14 but, whatever the reasoning, "debatable questions as to
reasonableness" are for the legislature, not the courts." 5

108. 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1044 (1975).
109. 362 F. Supp. at 1381. The plaintiff also sought injunctive relief against the
city's procedures for conducting hearings regarding obscenity and revoking a movie house
license. Id. at 1380.
110. The court cited, inter alia, Goldblatt v. Town Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
111. 362 F. Supp. at 1392 (emphasis added). The lack of application of strict scrutiny
in Stover and Bishop is puzzling.
112. 362 F. Supp. at 1392. The court rejected the argument that adult theaters could
not constitutionally be classified differently from ordinary movie theaters. "[P,]laintiff himself
has resorted to classification by restricting exhibition to adults only. The Legislature and
Mayor and Council are going a short step further than plaintiff by restricting the locale in
which the adult theater can operate." Id. at 1392-93. Plaintiff's choice of customers seems
irrelevant to the equal protection claim. Thus, the court managed to avoid issues regarding
discrimination as to content. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 supra and notes 140-142
infra. Obviously, the "right to disseminate motion pictures is not absolute." Chemline,
Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1966), but the power of the
city to allow one type of protected expression but not another presents a more difficult
problem for the courts.
113. 362 F. Supp. at 1392. The "incidental effect" argument is justifiable because the
ordinance did not prohibit the showing of adult movies; instead, it merely regulated the
time, place, and manner of their showing. According to the court, adult establishments
were undesirable in the prohibited locations because: (1) the type of clientele attracted to
them would be "inimical to the best interests" of the protected institutions; (2) children
should be free from the constant reminder that something is taking place within their
midst that they must not see; and (3) self-imposed discipline may not be effective. Id.
at 1393. Compare this rationale with Justice Steven's "secondary effect" rationale in Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2452 n.34 (1976).
114. 362 F. Supp. at 1393. The court's reliance on similar ordinances regarding distribution of alcoholic beverages is misplaced. First, the policy basis and interests promoted by a
free speech claim, even in the commercial context, transcend the purely economic argument
of a liquor dealer. Second, the states have been expressly granted greater control over the
distribution and use of alcoholic beverages. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, §2.
115. 562 F. Supp. at 1393. Neither of these assertions fill the obvious gaps in the
court's reasoning. The court may have been distracted by other issues in the case, in-
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Affirming the decision, the court of appeals held "that premising the revocation of a movie house license upon a violation of a valid state law or city
ordinance forbidding the exhibition of sexually explicit material does not
violate the right of free speech ....
."116 Thus, the holding in Bishop
significantly subdued a first amendment challenge in a context in which the
city has the ultimate sanction of revoking the challenger's license. The
district court's assertions as to the strength of the police power and zoning
ordinances and deference to the legislature seems incompatible with traditional first amendment analysis. 117 In short, the court asserted a presumptive
validity for the zoning ordinance that proved to be insurmountable, even for
a free speech claim.
In another case, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.," 8 theater and
bookstore owners challenged a Detroit city ordinance" 5 prohibiting the location of two or more regulated uses, including adult bookstores and theaters,
within 1000 feet of each other.1 20 Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory
relief on the grounds that the ordinance violated their constitutional rights

eluding a challenge of the city's mode of determining obscenity and the power of the city
to revoke plaintiff's license pursuant to the city ordinance.
116. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 482 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
117. See text accompanying notes 110 & 111 supra. There would seemingly be no
room for alternatives analysis under this approach, not to mention the deference normally
accorded the first amendment. While the result may have been the same, the court
would have been on safer ground if a more comprehensive analysis was undertaken, including
articulation of the factors involved in balancing competing interests. See Nortown Theatre,
Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See text accompanying notes 120-124
infra.
118. 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976).
119. DETROIT, MICH. OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE 7426, Nov. 2, 1972. The ordinance
provided inter alia: "The primary control or regulation is for the purpose of preventing a
concentration of certain uses in any one area (i.e., not more than two such uses within one
thousand feet of each other which would create such adverse effects.) Uses subject to
these controls are as follows: [Adult Book Store, Adult Motion Picture Theater, Adult Mini
Motion Picture Theater, Cabaret, etc.]" The establishments listed in the ordinances were
suitably defined, including reference to the materials purveyed. The ordinance was not
retroactive, and there was a waiver provision with respect to the 1000-foot requirement.
The motive for the regulation was specified as follows: "In the development and execution
of this Ordinance, it is recognized that there are some uses which, because of their very
nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly
when several of them are concentrated under certain circumstances thereby having a
deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas. Special regulation of these uses is necessary to
insure that these adverse effects will not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of
the surrounding neighborhood." American Mini Theatres v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1016
(6th Cir. 1975).
120. Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1971), rev'd sub.
nom. American Mini Theaters, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub.
nom. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976). The district court
case included a challenge to a separate provision of the ordinance that prohibited the
specified uses within 500 feet of a residential dwelling or rooming house. That provision
was invalidated by the district court. The analysis that follows centers on the 1000 foot
provision.
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under the first and fourteenth amendments. 1 21 The district court upheld the
1000-foot provision. As to the equal protection challenge,'1 22 the court found
a compelling state interest in the preservation of neighborhoods. 123 The court
then disposed of the plaintiff's "principal attack," holding that the "[b]urden
on First Amendment rights was slight" and that incidental regulation of first
amendment freedoms may be justified in furtherance of a "sufficiently im24
portant governmental interest."'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held the two ordinances invalid on equal
protection grounds125 The appellate court noted that there was no empirical
evidence that clustering of adult activities would destroy neighborhood values
in the areas where such concentrations take place. The court recognized a
compelling state interest on the part of the city to prevent a decline in "quality
of life";126 however, the means utilized to achieve these ends were declared
unconstitutional. Recognizing that special scrutiny is required when an equal
protection claim is based on a classification that abridges first amendment
rights, 2 7 the court found the ordinance defective since it imposed disparate

121. 373 F. Supp. at 365. The plaintiff also attacked the ordinance on due process
grounds of vagueness and absence of procedural safeguards.
122. Plaintiffs alleged that adult bookstores and theaters were treated differently than
bookstores and theaters in general. Id. at 369. In the ordinance, adult establishments were
defined as those that emphasize "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas."
"Specified Sexual Activities" are defined as: "1. Human Genitals in a state of sexual
stimulation or arousal; 2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock, or female
breast." "Specified Anatomical Areas" are defined as: "I.Less than completely and opaquely
covered; (a) human genitals, pubic region, (b) buttock, and (c) female breast below a point
immediately above the top of the areola; and 2. Human male genitals in a discernably
turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered." DETRorr, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING
ORDINANCE 742-G 32.0007, Nov. 2, 1972; CODE OF THE CrrY oF Daorr, MICH., 5-2-1.2 (1972).
123. 373 F. Supp. at 369. Finding a compelling state interest under close scrutiny is a
relatively rare occurrence. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Note,
Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. Cm. L.
Rxv. 807, 808 (1973); Case Comment, 52 J. URBAN L. 388, 393 (1974). The court relied on the
affidavit of a sociologist that indicated that the 1000-foot provision was necessary to promote
that interest. The affidavit cited sociological support for such regulation of adult establishments. 373 F. Supp. at 365, 369. The court refused to scrutinize the methods of regulation so
long as there was "some rational relationship between the objective of the Ordinance and
the methods adopted." 373 F. Supp. at 367.
124. 373 F. Supp. at 370. The burden on expression was slight because there were
"myriad" locations in Detroit where plaintiffs could establish their businesses. The court
concluded that the "conduct" that accompanied plaintiffs' expression was especially subject
to regulation because it pertained to "business and economic" matters. Id.
125. 518 F.2d 1014, 1021 (6th Cir. 1975).
126. Id. at 1018. By accepting the lower court's finding that the city demonstrated a
compelling state interest, the court of appeals, in effect, preserved the traditional presumptive
validity of zoning regulations.
127. 518 F.2d at 1019. The court noted that the city's regulation was tantamount to
prior restraint and the city did not discharge the heavy burden required to uphold such
discriminatory classification. Id. The city had the burden of showing that the method
chosen to deal with the problem at hand was necessary and the abridgment of free
speech was only incidental. Id. See note 21 supra.
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treatment on establishments that distributed or displayed certain specified
materials. 1.2

On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding
that Detroit's interest in the present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately supported the incidental limitation imposed by the
ordinance on expression.' 9 In a plurality opinion,130 Justice Stevens noted
that the principal issue of the case was whether the Detroit ordinance was
unconstitutional because of its classification based on the content of "communication protected by the First Amendment."' 131 After disposing of respondent's
vagueness challenge, the Court turned to the first amendment and equal pro1

tection issues.

32

In response to a contention that the ordinance was an unconstitutional
prior restraint of speech, Justice Stevens noted that respondent did not claim
that Detroit had limited access to adult theaters; instead, the "market for this
commodity [was] essentially unrestrained" in Detroit.133 Zoning laws can
control the location of any theater or commercial establishment. The "mere
fact that commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment" was subject to zoning was not a sufficient reason for invalidating the
ordinance.134 Thus, the free speech claim in itself did not seriously challenge
Detroit's comprehensive zoning plan. The equal protection issue, however,
presented a more difficult problem.
Prefacing his discussion of equal protection with brief remarks of
deference to the right of free speech,135 Justice Stevens proceeded to deal with
128. Id. at 1020. The court cited Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See text
accompanying notes 18-36 supra. The Sixth Circuit concluded that this was not a case
involving "'general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise ....
'" 518 F.2d at 1020 (emphasis original).
The dissent argued for validation of the 1000-foot restriction, relying on the historical
deference to zoning regulation and the necessity for allowing legislative judgment to control.
Distinguishing Mosley, the dissent noted that while Mosley consisted of an outright ban
of picketing near schools, the Detroit ordinance only forbid the concentration of regulated
establishments. Since there were myriad locations for such establishments in Detroit, the
ordinance was merely a "time, place, and manner" regulation. Id. at 1024. According to
the dissent, the ordinance had only an incidental effect on speech while pursuing a compelling public interest. The dissent thus characterized the ordinance as a valid exercise of
the police power necessary to the survival of the city. Id. at 1025. "It seems to me that
if we are to prevent our cities from becoming uninhabitable jungles, we must, within
constitutional safeguards, restore to our cities the right of self-government." Id.
129. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2453 (1976).
130. Justice Powell concurrcd in the result and parts I and II of the opinion (vagueness
and free speech issues). Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
131. 96 S. Ct. at 2443.
132. The court noted that even if there was some uncertainty about the application
of the ordinance, the vagueness had not affected respondents who never proposed offering
other than adult fare at their establishments. Id. at 2446-47.
133. Id. at 2448. See 373 F. Supp. at 370; 518 F.2d at 1024 (dissenting opinion). Compare
the courts' analyses with 106 Forsythe Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (M.D. Ga.
1972).
134. 96 S. Ct. at 2448. In making this argument, Justice Stevens set aside the fact
that adult establishments were treated differently than other theaters.
135. ld. at 2449. Justice Stevens utilized the oft quoted remark of Voltaire. "I disapprove
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the governmental ability to regulate expression. 136 First, he stated that: "The
sovereign's agreement or disagreement with the content of what a speaker
has to say may not affect the regulation of the time, place, or manner of
presenting the speech."' 137 Though recognizing the danger of regulation based
on content, Justice Stevens noted that, in certain contexts, the content of
expression may be the basis both for classification of speech and determination
of the extent of protection to be accorded." 8 One such context is zoning
regulation."39 In reaching this result, Justice Stevens severely limited the
scope of the holding in Police Department v. Mosley. 40o He noted that the
absolute statements in Mosley prohibiting regulation of expressive conduct
based on content must not be "read literally and without regard for the
facts of the case in which it was made."' 4' After establishing the ability of
the government to make content distinctions, Justice Stevens defined the
outer limit of content regulation: lines drawn on the basis of content must
not violate "the Government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its
42
regulation of protected communication."'
Justice Stevens then turned to the regulatory effect of the Detroit
ordinance. He noted that the first amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of offensive materials that are not obscene but that some forms of
non-obscene expression merit less protection than political oratory or
philosophical discussion.' 43 The Court held that the state "may legitimately

of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." Id. (quoting
TALLENTYE, THE FaRmNas OF VOLTAiRE 199 (1907)). The remainder of Justice Stevens'
opinion received only the minority support of the Court.
136. More specifically, the ability of the government to regulate expressive activity
"predicated in whole or in part on the content of the communication" was at issue. 96
S. Ct. at 2450.
137. Id. at 2449.
138. Id. at 2450. Other contexts included commercial speech. See Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (while commercial products could be advertised on city
buses, political advertising was prohibited). A good portion of Justice Stevens' opinion
was devoted to analogous dicta regarding commercial speech. 96 S.Ct. at 2451-52.
139. Id. at 2452-53.
140. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See text accompanying notes 26-36 supra. Justice Stevens said
that "[b]road statements of principle, no matter how correct in the context in which they
are made, are sometimes qualified by contrary decisions because the absolute limit of
the stated principle is reached." 96 S.Ct. at 2450.
141. Justice Stevens seemed to be heeding the warning of Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Mosley. "Mhe language used in the discussion of the First Amendment
could, if read out of context, be misleading." 408 U.S. 92, 102-03 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 30-32 supra.
142. 96 S.Ct. at 2452.
143. Id. According to Justice Stevens, society has less interest in protecting offensive
expression. "Few of us would march our sons and daughters to war to preserve the
citizens right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id.
This approach seems to lead to a much more difficult role for the courts in determining
the amount of protection to be afforded speech because the line would no longer be
clear even after a determination is made regarding obscenity. Since a majority of the
Court did not espouse this view its precedential value is doubtful. Justice Powell expressly
declined to support this holding. Id. at 2453 n.1 (concurring opinion).
S.G.
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use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different
classification from other motion pictures." 1 The Court then adopted the
district court's view regarding the city's interest in preserving the character
of its neighborhoods. 145 According to Justice Stevens, it was not the function
of the Court to appraise the merits of the city's approach' ' 146to its problems;
rather, the city's efforts should be "accorded high respect.
A significant distinction regarding the purpose of the ordinance appeared
in a footnote to the plurality opinion. The ordinance was enacted to preserve
the quality of Detroit's neighborhoods, not to regulate the dissemination of
offensive expression.147 This, noted Justice Stevens, was regulation of a
"secondary effect" of expression that distinguished the instant case from those
dealing with protection of the citizenry from unwanted exposure to offensive
speech.'

48

Finally, Justice Stevens characterized the limitation as to location as
incidental 149 even though the determination of which theaters would be
regulated turned on content. The Court held that the city's interest in the
character of the neighborhoods adequately supported such classification and
that zoning ordinances prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from being
located within 1000 feet of each other does not violate the equal protection
clause.' 50 It is notable that in reaching this result the plurality opinion did
not cite or refer to a single zoning case!' 5 '
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, on the other hand, presented a
more comprehensive balancing approach on the equal protection issue. He
viewed the case as an example of innovative, necessary land use control that
had but an incidental impact on speech. 1 52 Utilizing an analysis similar to
that of the district court, the ordinance withstood a rigorous balancing
approach that included "careful inquiry into the competing concerns of
the State and the interests protected by . . . free expression."' 15 3 This being

a true case of first impression'154 Justice Powell refused to mechanically apply
doctrines developed in other contexts. 155 Since the major emphasis of Justice
Powell's first amendment concern was on free access of the public to the
144. Id. at 2452.
145. Id. See text accompanying notes 122 &c123 supra. The Court commented that
there was a factual basis for Detroit's approach to the problem. Id. at 2452-53.
146. Id. Furthermore, Justice Stevens would allow the city reasonable opportunity to
experiment with solutions to its problems. Id. at 2453.

147. Id. at 2452 n.34.
148. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-12 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). Erznoznik was convincingly distinguished by Justices Stevens and Powell.

96 S. Ct. at 2452 n.33 9- 34, 2458.
149, 96 S. Ct. at 2453. See 373 F. Supp. at 371.
150. 96 S. Ct. at 2453.
151. Except, of course, the district court and court of appeals decisions on the instant
case were cited and utilized to some extent by Justice Stevens.
152. Id. at 2453.
153. Id. at 2455.
154. "This is the first case in this Court in which the interests in free expression . . .
have been implicated by a municipality's commercial zoning ordinances." Id.
155. Id.
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expression, the impact of the ordinance was found to be incidental. 56 Justice
Powell noted that the interests protected by. the ordinance were substantial
and that preservation of the character of a city is one of the most significant
57
functions of local government
Justice Stewart's dissent vigorously opposed diminishing the protected
status of offensive expression 55 and compromising the "cardinal principles"
of first amendment law that prohibit content discrimination. 159 While
effectively arguing for full protection for offensive speech, the dissent was
less persuasive regarding content discrimination. First, the cases relied on
by the dissent are clearly distinguishable in fact and policy from the instant
situation.160 Second, application of such a principle precludes comprehensive
analysis of competing policies.
The dissent made a futile attempt to carry the banner of Mosley to the
zoning context. Justice Stewart indicated he would, in the interest of free
expression, proscribe "selective interference with protected speech whose
content is thought to produce distasteful effects."'161 But Detroit's content
distinction was directly related to the special overriding interest of protecting
the character of the city's neighborhoods. Although only a plurality of the
court expressly abandoned the extreme approach of Mosley, the validity
of such a position on the instant facts is dubious. 62 While the dissent considered the instant decision an "aberration" that "runs roughshod" over first
amendment principles, 163 Justice Stewart failed to muster sufficient substantive
arguments to undermine the result.
The American Mini Theatres case presents some unique policy issues
that were not completely covered in the courts' opinions. First, the Detroit
ordinance exemplifies a fairly unique treatment of the problems created by
adult establishments.'" The issue presented by this policy selection on the
part of Detroit is the extent to which the courts should and are qualified to
examine alternative plans. 65 The policies and analysis behind the legislative
decision are undoubtedly complex and based on studies in scientific fields
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2457.
158. Justice Stewart pointed out the difficulty of a judicial determination of what topics
are "important" or should receive more or less protection from the courts. Id. at 2460.
159. Id. at 2459-60.
160. See note 148 supra. It is doubtful whether cases from other contexts should be
applied to the instant fact situation.
161. 96 S.Ct. at 2459.
162. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, distinguished Mosley because there was
no governmental interest justifying a distinction between the types of messages permitted.
96 S. Ct. at 2458 n.6.
163. Id. at 2459-60.
164. Most cities have attempted to contain their "porn shops" within a single district.
"Every major U.S. city has its Santa Monica Boulevard. In Chicago, it is called Wells
Street. San Francisco has its Broadway, and New York City its Times Square." TIME, April
5. 1976, at 58. This seems to be the most favorable method for control and to safeguard
the privacy rights of citizens. Such control would seem to also satisfy the time, place, and
manner restriction on the police power.
165. See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
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that lend to manifold solutions to the same problem.16 Such decisions are
often left to the legislature, and the instant courts chose to avoid this
issue,167 but avoidance of issues is not a desirable role for the judiciary. 6
A second issue raised by American Mini Theatres is that the city's plan
seems to spread the blight rather than control it. This impacts on the right
to privacy of individuals who wish to avoid exposure to offensive matter and
the crime incident to such establishments.' 6 9 Thus, the city is placed in a
precarious situation. While there is an obligation to employ the police power
to protect citizens from unwilling exposure to offensive materials and crime,
large blighted areas in the center city would undoubtedly create an unfavorable
economic impact.17O Framed in this manner, the subordination of the right
166. See note 123 supra. The judiciary today is faced with a significant decision: either
the courts will take notice of and allow social and economic information to be presented
in land use planning litigation or they will make decisions based on outdated precedent

and outmoded concepts. F.

BOSSELMAN,

D. CALLIES,

& J.

BANTA, TilE

TAKING ISSUE 287

(1973). Whether courts should or can delve into such legislative areas is at issue. The
judicial tools required for such an excursion include judicial notice and the "Brandeis brief."
See

J.

MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE, AND COMMON LAw

171-72 (1947) [hereinafter cited

as J. MAGUIRE]. The "Brandeis brief" presents the court with statistics, opinions, and factual
assertions, and the litigants impliedly request the court to take judicial notice of the reliability
of the material. J. MAGUIRE 171-74. Since Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), when the
"Brandeis brief" was first introduced to the Supreme Court, use of factual analysis has
achieved a prominent place in the Court's decisional process. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Use of behavioral science data was not without criticism. See,
e.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence, in 1954 SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 809, 826-27. Some lower courts
have successfully used these techniques in the zoning context with notable results in the
resolution of complex factual issues. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359,
285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (growth control
ordinance in urban area); Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d
129 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966) (careful documentation presented on hazards of
housing oceanward of the designated building line in a coastal setback scheme); Potomac
Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1040 (1972) (evidence presented on biological condition of wetlands and the potential
ecological consequences without protection). The Supreme Court, followed by most
federal and state courts, has declined to apply such review in the zoning area. See, e.g.,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town
of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 967 (1st Cir. 1972) (the court recognized the need for further
professional or scientific data yet left the matter to the discretion of the local authority).
167. But see 96 S. Ct. at 2-457 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
168. The courts should not turn from an issue solely on the basis of difficulty or
complexity. If the courts are to keep pace with the legislative motives and policy and
accomplish a meaningful balancing fuinction, they must follow the vanguard of state courts
that have successfully applied these techniques in the zoning context. Some alternatives for
the court are as follows: (I) using judicial notice, the court may decide whether a zoning
plan or regulation is unreasonable though supported by expert authority; (2) the court
may take judicial notice of valid successful land use plans in other jurisdictions facing
similar problems as a means of alternatives analysis; (3) higher courts can accept the
factual findings of lower courts on complex local issues; (4) the courts may determine that
articulated legislative policies must defer to stronger, competing policies on their face.
See generally Note, Judicial Notice: Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 723 (1976).
169. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
170. See TIME, April 5, 1976 at 63. New York is faced with a similar problem regarding

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 4
19761

LAND USE PLANNING

of privacy in favor of relieving inner city problems seems to be a decision
reasonably within legitimate legislative bounds.
The American Mini Theatres case is significant for reasons that impact
on both free speech and land use planning. The Supreme Court continued
to have difficulty resolving the status of speech and expressive conduct that
is less than obscene yet offensive. The ability of government to make
content distinctions in regulating expression has not been decisively resolved.
But the presumptive validity of zoning seems to have survived intact. Great
deference was given to the city's interest in the present and future character of
its neighborhoods and the prerogatives of the legislature in dealing with the
problem. None of the opinions required the city to apply a "least restrictive
alternative"; instead, the plurality opinion indicated that the city's solutions
should be accorded "high respect."'171 The first amendment and equal protection issues arguably gave rise to a less strict scrutiny in the zoning context
1 2
than in some other contexts. 7
The plurality opinion of Justice Stevens conducted a somewhat ad hoc
balancing of interests. After finding the state could legitimately use content
of the materials as a basis of classification, Justice Stevens found that the
legitimate interest of the city outweighed the incidental effect of the ordinance
on expression. The balancing portion of the opinion comprised less than
two paragraphs. 178
Justice Powell, on the other hand, devoted the bulk of his concurring
opinion to a detailed analysis of the competing issues and policies. After
defining the scope of the inquiry based on the context and type of expression
involved, Justice Powell analyzed the weight to be accorded the competing
interests. He then applied the four-part O'Brien test, which indicated that
the city's action was permissible.
The O'Brien test was established by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien, 4 a first amendment case that upheld the power of Congress to
sanction punishment of an individual for burning his draft registration
176
certificate. 75 O'Brien asserted that his act was protected "symbolic speech."'
Times Square. An attempt to limit "porn shops" and massage parlors to Times Square
has created an outcry from theater owners and businessmen that the adult establishments
are "choking midtown." Id.
171. See text accompanying notes 145 & 146 supra.
172. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Schneider v. State, 308

U.S. 147 (1939).
173. 96 S.Ct. at 2452-53.
174. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien was convicted for burning his draft card on the
steps of the Courthouse in South Boston in violation of the 1965 amendment to the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1948, which indicated that a criminal offense was
committed by anyone "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any
manner changes any such certificate .... " Id. at 370 (emphasis original).
175. Id. at 386. There are alternatives to the balancing approach described herein. The
categorization approach was developed in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) and
applied in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-22, 24 (1971). See also Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957). This approach would place the expression within or without a
protected category. See Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 722, 754 (1975).
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The Supreme Court rejected the argument by indicating that when "speech"
and "nonspeech" are combined in the same activity, a "sufficiently important
governmental interest" in regulating the nonspeech portion of the activity
may justify incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms. Governmental
regulation is justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an "important or substantial governmental interest";
(3) the interest of the government is not related to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) the "incidental restriction" on free expression is "no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'' 1 The O'Brien
Court found that the challenged statute met these requirements and O'Brien's
conviction was not unconstitutional '1 8 and, perhaps more importantly,
established a test applicable in a variety of contexts.
Justice Powell's application of the O'Brien test afforded more complete
protection for the first amendment interests involved than the ad hoc
approach in the plurality opinion. The O'Brien test, or a similar comprehensive
balancing of competing interests, should be used whenever zoning regulation
meets a first amendment challenge.1 7 9 The first requirement of the test, that

the regulation be within the constitutional power of the government, is easily
satisfied in the zoning context.180 The presumptive validity of zoning could
have a large impact on part two of the test - the determination of whether
the governmental interest is important or substantial. The American Mini
Theatres case indicates that judicial deference in this regard will continues'
but that deference to zoning should not seriously prevent full first amendment
analysis provided the last two parts of the test are rigorously applied.
Under the third part of the test, the governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression. An intent or purpose to restrict
the communication itself would be an impermissible restraint. Thus, if the
Detroit ordinance was drafted in an effort to protect citizens against the content
of the adult movies, it would fail this portion of the test.182 The difficult issue
of legislative motive arises in this context. In People v. Stover, the admitted
goal of the ordinance was to suppress defendant's bizarre expression. The
town also had a legitimate interest in the regulation unrelated to the
suppressing motive. But, applying the O'Brien test strictly, a court could

176. O'Brien felt that a 1965 enactment prohibiting destruction of draft cards was
unconstitutional as applied to him. 391 U.S. at 386.
177. Id. at 377. The O'Brien test has received much usage by the courts in a variety
of contexts. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976) (distinguishing O'Brien in the
campaign finance context). While the lower court applied the O'Brien test, the Supreme
Court in Valeo noted that the expenditure of money cannot be equated to burning a
draft card. 96 S. Ct. at 633-34.
178. Id. at 382. For an effective critical analysis of O'Brien's "symbolic speech" test,
see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 ]IARv. L. Rav. 1482, 1483 (1975).
179. See text accompanying note 177 supra.
180. See 96 S.Ct. at 2457; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
181. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) ; 106 Forsyth Corp.
v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
182. 96 S.Ct. at 2457 n.4.
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determine that the enactment of the ordinance was directly related to the
suppression of expression and should be invalidated as applied to the
defendants. 183 The stricter interpretation would be in keeping with first amendment policies and is probably the better approach, but courts have been
reluctant to delve into motive and would likely reach the Stover result using
a less strict analysis.184
The last part of the O'Brien test is actually a twofold analysis: the restriction on first amendment freedoms must not only be incidental but also be
no greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest in regulation.
The latter requirement, if strictly construed, would seem to call for application
of alternatives analysis. Applying an alternatives analysis in this situation in
reliance on prior first amendment doctrine 5 would provide more comprehensive protection for first amendment freedoms. However, the burden on
the courts might outweigh the benefits,:"" and a less strict interpretation of
the test is more compatible with the presumptive validity of zoning. The
fourth part of the test also calls for a determination that the restriction
of speech is incidental. In many respects this portion of the test may be
the key to the analysis in the zoning context, and it can be the weakest
link in making the test an equivocal one. This was amply illustrated by the
application of the O'Brien test in the American Mini Theatres case. The
district court and the court of appeals applied the same test to the facts of
the case at hand with opposite results - one viewing the ordinance as having
an incidental effect on expression 87 and the other determining that the
ordinance was an impermissible restraint on expression.' 88
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell conducted a well-reasoned analysis
of the impact of the ordinance on expression. His approach explored two
questions: 189 (1) Did the ordinance limit the content of adult movies or the
ability of the creators to make them available to whom they desire? (2) Did it
restrict access to the movies for those who wish to see them?
Since the content or effectiveness of the movies was not dependent on
where or how it was conveyed, the effect of the ordinance on these interests
was minimal.190 The factual context is an important factor in an analysis of
the impact of zoning regulations on free speech; therefore, the fourth part
of the O'Brien test must remain flexible in order to afford protection to the
competing interests. Despite its difficulty of application and possibly equivocal
results, the O'Brien test has the potential of remaining an effective safeguard
for free expression interests in the zoning context.

183. Cf. text accompanying note 182 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 97-107 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 198-200 infra.
187. 373 F. Supp. at 370.
188. 518 F.2d at 1020. Justice Powell's application of the O'Brien test favored the

district court's findings. 96 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
189. 96 S. Ct. at 2456.
190. Id. at 2456 &n.2.
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As noted above,191 the presumption in favor of the zoning power permitted the courts to avoid analysis of policies and complex fact issues. A
similar presumption exists with regard to freedom of speech. The fundamental rights trigger close scrutiny in an automatic fashion without specific
regard for underlying policies that are deemed to be implied or inherent in
free speech. There are dangers in making such sweeping generalizations. First,
legal writers, lawyers, and even judges are attracted to simplified, catchall
phrases that shrink various policies and considerations to a few words. All
too often unarticulated policies are misunderstood, misapplied, or forgotten
the next time the phrase is used. 192 Second, the use of generalities centers the
strength of the first amendment in historical terms and perspective, preventing
the examination of the issues in light of current developments and trends.
Yet, there is a further danger in the instant situation. Free speech and
zoning have achieved a high degree of protection from such words and phrases
as fundamental, preferred power (or right), and absolute.193 In many cases,
the effect of the protection was to hide the true policies behind free speech
and zoning.194 When free speech and zoning were finally pitted against each
other, the courts should not have been precluded from piercing the protective
shell created by these generalities to examine policies and resolve the issues.
Courts should display the policy basis not only in cases involving the zoning
power but also in cases concerning the first amendment.
ALTERNATIVES IN SCRUTINIZING ZONING

It is not unreasonable to assume that freedom of expression will again
confront zoning regulation; thus, the alternatives available to the courts
in disposing of the issues should be explored. Assuming that the challenger
overcomes the preliminary issues of standing and justiciable controversy, the
court is faced with the following alternatives, which may be used separately
or in combination with each other: the court can (1)assert a presumptive
validity for the zoning regulation,195 (2) thrust aside the presumptive validity
in the face of strict scrutiny, (3) examine alternatives by which the desired

191. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra. The presumption of validity has been
under attack from courts and commentators, and there is a recent trend that seems to
be gathering momentum that classifies zoning as administrative or quasi-judicial activity.
The result of such a classification would be the subjection of land use planning to more
extensive judicial review. See Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative
or Quasi-Judicial Act: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MicH. L. REV. 1341 (1975).
At least three states are considering this approach: Washington, Oregon, and Michigan. Id.
at 1342.
192. Like Justice Cardozo's comment with regard to metaphors, generalities often
"[start] as devices to liberate thought, [but] they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third
Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 88, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
193. See text accompanying notes 3, 4, & 65-70 supra.
194. See, e.g., Williams & Doughty, Studies in Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle
Terre, and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 75-76 (1975).
195. See text accompanying notes 65-82 supra.
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regulative result may be achieved, 96 (4) apply the O'Brien test,1 97 and
(5) examine policies articulated by the local legislature and balance them
with first amendment policies. The issue as to the mode and amount of
scrutiny to be applied is a difficult one. The advantages of closely examining
the policies, motives, and alternatives behind the regulations are countered
by the difficulty of the task 19s and potential criticism regarding judicial legislation.199 The courts would also be faced with the criticism that they are
200
making decisions in an area in which they have little expertise.
The decisions, however, must be made, 20 1 and the judiciary is the only
institution available to make them. The judiciary, as a protector of individual
rights,202 is the last line of defense against abuse of the police power. The
lack of prior involvement of the courts in land use policy analysis is not a
valid excuse for continued nonintervention. As new types of challenges to
the zoning power arise, the appropriate form of judicial review must be
applied. When a first amendment challenge is asserted against a zoning regulation, strict scrutiny is required. The presumptive validity of zoning regulation
is antithetical to such scrutiny and should be breached to the extent that it
interferes with the strict, protective analysis required in the first amendment
context. If the O'Brien test is utilized, the presumptive validity should be
applied only in the first two parts of the test. 203 Zoning policy and alternatives
should not be beyond the scope of judicial review. Since strict scrutiny applies
in the context of free expression, the courts should be obliged to pierce the
barrier of presumptive validity to examine and balance competing policies. 204
THE EFFECT

OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE

Until Belle Terre20 5 zoning regulation had not met a major challenge to
its autonomy and relative immunity from the courts. Belle Terre left the
196. See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 174-178 supra.
198. Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367 (1926). This is
undoubtedly a factor affecting the fact that the Court has declined to become a "zoning
board of appeals." Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974). See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
Lose?, 43 Gzo. WASH. L. REv. 590, 609 (1975) (citing Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
County of Bucks, 22 Bucks Co. Rep. 179 (1972)). See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
of Bucks, 22 Bucks Co. Rep. 179 (1972)). See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
201. Cf. T.I. EMERSON, TiE SYSTEM OF FREEDON oF ExPRESSION 11-20 (1970). Regardless
of the difficulty involved in resolving a dispute, the courts must make a decision on
justiciable issues. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
202. See Schnidman, supranote 200, at 609.
203. See text accompanying notes 181-182 supra.
204. A discussion of the jurisprudential issues raised by this problem is beyond the
scope of this work. Balancing the competing interests involved here would seem to be
virtually impossible utilizing precedent from zoning and first amendment cases. While such
a balancing role for the courts is not a viable alternative under present legal attitudes, the
law, science, and policy perspective would seem to be better equipped to handle these
problems at least on a theoretical level. See H.D. Lasswell & M.S. McDougal, Jurisprudence
in Policy-OrientedPerspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 486 (1967).
205. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See text accompanying notes 87-96 supra.
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zoning power intact but threatened by the dissenting opinion of Justice
Marshall. 20 6 The zoning power remains vulnerable to challenge when fundamental rights are asserted. The impact of a change in attitude regarding the
role of the courts in zoning cases could have significant impact on land use
planning and freedom of expression. The ideal resolution of a case in which
zoning and free speech are in conflict should, through balancing, preserve
both of these important interests.207 However, ideal results are seldom achieved.
It is useful to explore the potential impact on the zoning power should the
presumptive validity of zoning ordinances be limited.
First, if freedom of expression infringes on the zoning power, the door
will be opened to a variety of challenges.2 0 8 It has been said that the first
amendment has an "umbrella effect, drawing into its shelter doctrines from
many other areas of the law." 20 9 Thus, other legal doctrines may be given
renewed strength when facing zoning by being asserted in conjunction with
or bolstered by a first amendment claim. Second, the case law surrounding
sign and architectural control was developed utilizing that deferential
attitude on the part of the courts. 2

10

Given a first amendment inroad into

zoning, a free speech argument may lend new strength to challenges in
these areas. If the commercial speech doctrine is further eroded, making
purely commercial advertising protected speech, the impact would be even
greater.21 'Third, a first amendment inroad into the power to zone may create
problems for local planners. The present system makes land use planning
primarily a local function.212 Courts are neither as knowledgeable nor as
flexible as zoning boards in these matters. An increase in the role of the
courts in zoning decision making could create a "chilling effect" on creative
206. Id. at 12-20. Compare American Mini Theatres v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir.
1975) with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 396 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting). ("The right
of free speech, strong though it be, is not absolute; when the right to speak conflicts with
the right to an impartial judicial proceeding, an accommodation must be made to preserve
the essence of both.").
208. For example, the rights of privacy and association might be asserted as in
Belle Terre. It is arguable that if the majority in Belle Terre had found a legitimate
associational or privacy claim, they would have reached a result similar to that of Justice
Marshall's dissent.
209. T.I. EMERSON, supra note 201, at 15. An example of this is the merger of free speech
and equal protection discussed above. See text accompanying notes 15-36 supra.
210. See, e.g., National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d
(1970) (sign control); Missouri ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley,
33, appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 9,16
458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (architectural control); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191
N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
211. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 96 S.Ct.
1817 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Bigelow opinion has resulted
in an opposite interpretation by the lower courts with regard to the survival of the
commercial speech doctrine that originated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
F.
Compare Terminal-Hudson Electronics, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs,
, 44 U.S.L.W. 2337 (D.C.C. Cal. 1976) with Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc.,
Supp.
528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
212. Note the parallel between the local authority in zoning and the determination of
obscenity by local standards. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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land use planning. The first amendment constraint would inhibit planners'
2
flexibility by constituting another pitfall to be avoided. "
However, the full potential harm to the power to zone if freedom of
speech prevails is not likely to be realized. The courts are sufficiently adept in
dealing with dual standards, especially with regard to fundamental rights.
The only time zoning would be subject to the loss of its presumption of
validity would be when strict scrutiny is applied.21 4 In the vast majority
of cases, the zoning and local planning functions will be as strong as in
the past.215 The courts are well aware and may even take judicial notice of
the plight of urban areas. Clearly, the courts should invalidate zoning regulations only to prevent injustice, and then only when legitimate alternatives
are present. 216 Since the courts are in a balancing role, 217 they have an interest
in preserving each of the competing interests. As to the umbrella effect, there
have been many situations in which freedom of expression has prevailed
without the subsequent erosion of the competing power or interest.2'8 The
courts have the omnipresent authority to distinguish or limit prior cases on
their facts, and these methods will undoubtedly be employed when justice

demands

it.218

If zoning is preferred to freedom of expression in a manner similar to the
result in People v. Stover,220 the outcome could arguably influence individual
freedoms. First, the presumptive validity of zoning legislation would be applied
a fortiori against other fundamental rights, including rights not explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. 22 ' Second, when restrictions on expression are
imposed, it is difficult to outline precise limitations. Allowing zoning to prevail
213. The plight of American cities is infamous. The goal of urban planning is to
improve the slum areas and prevent further deterioration of the inner cities. The monumental nature of this task accents the need for a wide range of weapons in the planner's
arsenal. The removal of any measure of flexibility would likely be disastrous to such an
effort. See, e.g., Davidoff & Gold, Exclusionary Zoning, 1 YALE REv. oF LAw & Soc. AcnON
57 (Winter 1970).
214. By Mosley-American Mini Theatres standards, it is likely that the power to
zone would retain its presumption, of constitutionality unless the free expression challenge
is bolstered by an equal protection claim. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
215. It is not often that freedom of expression confronts zoning and planning. Generally
urban planners have far more threatening battles to fight than the limitation of expression
outside of time, place; and manner restrictions.
216. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014,. 1020 (6th Cir. 1975)
(where the court listed alternatives-by which the city could regulate adult establishments).
See note 168 supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
218. E.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See also text accompanying notes
46-51 supra. If other fundamental rights are legitimately pitted against zoning, they should
be accorded the appropriate level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 12-18 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
219. The American Mini Theatres case, for example, is unique in the mode and
scope of the ordinance. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 98-104 supra. It would be possible for the Court to
leave freedom of speech virtually intact by characterizing the regulation as a time, place,
or manner restriction.
221. Contra, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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presumptively over expression might cut wider and deeper than is necessary
to accomplish planning goals. The discretionary power placed in the hands
of local officials is subject to abuse.2 22 Moreover, the problem is complicated
by the fact that the underlying motive of the legislature would not normally
be subject to review.223 This would allow the government constitutionally to
censor expression directed against itself through a zoning ordinance.224 This

cuts directly into the fabric of the first amendment goals of promoting open,
robust debate on public issues and prohibiting governmental regulation as
2
to form or content of individual expression. 25

CONCLUSION

The gravity of the urban problems confronting our cities today is beyond
dispute. Notwithstanding the expanding authority granted to planners under
the police power to zone, city governments seem to be losing ground with
regard to white flight, erosion of the tax base, and mounting crime. In the
face of these difficulties, planners are warned of a potential limit on their
zoning authority in the name of fundamental rights. What are the legal
ramifications of these limits?
First of all, this limit to the zoning authority is not new. It has existed
from the beginning, along with the ability of the judiciary to define the
limits. Fundamental rights have not directly clashed with zoning in the past
for lack of a justiciable issue on the matter, standing, or the desire to litigate.
Now that the matter is in the open, however, it should be examined fully,
lest the impact seem greater than it actually is. Zoning will still maintain a
presumption of validity. 'In the few cases in which a litigant can assert the
violation of a fundamental right such as free speech, the court will apply a
stricter standard of review. The underlying policy behind the zoning regulations and perhaps even alternative methods of accomplishing the government's goals should be examined fully. In this manner, the court is performing
a most valued role as arbiter with regard to individual rights in the face of
police power. If a legitimate governmental interest merits protection, it will
receive such protection notwithstanding a first amendment challenge. The
judiciary is the last line of defense for individual rights, especially in the
area of zoning regulation. A byproduct of these new challenges may be more
Cf., T.I. EMERSON, supra note 201, at 10.
223. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see note 103 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 98-104 supra; People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191
N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
225. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 24 (1971). The potential harm to the communication of ideas would be much less if
zoning regulations are given deference short of presumptive validity. The effect would be
somewhat similar to time, place, and manner restrictions, and the courts would have
room to balance competing interests. There are daily controls that government exercises
over communicators that do not jeopardize free expression. Consider, for example, the
potential effect of zoning regulations on the location of a newspaper office, of city power
and light on the operation of the presses, and of the state's taxes on the paper's solvency.
The courts can exercise a balancing function so that legitimate governmental interests
are accomplished while fundamental rights are preserved.
222.
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frequent involvement of the courts in zoning issues. Despite the inherent
difficulties of the initial entry of the courts into closer scrutiny of zoning
regulation, individual rights and the public interest in general would be
promoted in the long run by judicial activism in this area.
If zoning achieved a preferred status, although not presumptive validity,
over free speech, it is not likely that there would be significant harm to the
communication of ideas. The presence of the courts in a safeguarding role
virtually assures constitutional zoning regulations. The courts would continue to balance the interests involved and draw the lines to achieve a just
result.
Perhaps the most valuable lesson in the analysis of the interaction
between free speech and zoning lies in identifying the manner in which
the judiciary has withdrawn from the scrutiny of zoning policy. By allowing
zoning regulations a presumptive validity, by limiting the number of cases
to reach the Supreme Court, and by declaring the zoning process to be a
local function, the judiciary made it more difficult to enter the area and
deal with every aspect of an issue that clearly needs complete judicial analysis.
The problem was further complicated by the unwieldly rhetoric that pervades the free speech and zoning areas. But the difficulty of the task should
never deter the courts from accomplishing the all-important function of
arbiter in balancing the interests between government and the individual in
property regulation.
RALPH ARTIGLIERE
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